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Game theoretical analysis of incentives for large-scale, fully
decentralized collaboration networks
Abstract
One of the key challenges in peer-to-peer networks is the design of incentives to encourage peers to
share their resources. Incentives are necessary in order to exploit the full potential of these systems. The
tit-for-tat incentive scheme, as used in BitTorrent for example, has proven to be a successful approach in
P2P file sharing systems, where peers have direct relations and share the same kind of resources.
However, in P2P systems where different kind of resources are shared between peers with non-direct
relations, the design of incentives remains a challenge. In this paper, a large-scale, fully decentralized
P2P collaboration network is shown, where peers share not only bandwidth and storage space, but also
contribute by editing articles and voting for or against changes. A new incentive scheme is proposed
which supports non-direct relations and provides incentives for sharing different kind of resources. The
incentive scheme is based on a reputation system that assigns a reputation value to every peer reflecting
its previous behavior in the network. Based on this value, the service level is differentiated, i.e. the
higher a peer's reputation the better the quality of service it can get from the network. The service
differentiation has been analyzed and simulated with rational, irrational and altruistic peers based on
game theory concepts.
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Abstract—One of the key challenges in peer-to-peer networks
is the design of incentives to encourage peers to share their
resources. Incentives are necessary in order to exploit the full
potential of these systems. The tit-for-tat incentive scheme, as
used in BitTorrent for example, has proven to be a successful
approach in P2P file sharing systems, where peers have direct
relations and share the same kind of resources. However, in P2P
systems where different kind of resources are shared between
peers with non-direct relations, the design of incentives remains
a challenge. In this paper, a large-scale, fully decentralized P2P
collaboration network is shown, where peers share not only
bandwidth and storage space, but also contribute by editing
articles and voting for or against changes. A new incentive scheme
is proposed which supports non-direct relations and provides
incentives for sharing different kind of resources. The incentive
scheme is based on a reputation system that assigns a reputation
value to every peer reflecting its previous behavior in the network.
Based on this value, the service level is differentiated, i.e. the
higher a peer’s reputation the better the quality of service it
can get from the network. The service differentiation has been
analyzed and simulated with rational, irrational and altruistic
peers based on game theory concepts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks have received much attention in
the past because they have many advantages over client-server
architectures, including fault tolerance, higher scalability, and
less maintenance costs.
However, one of the drawbacks of P2P networks is that
participants tend not to share their resources, which can result
in a serious loss of performance [1], [8]. Thus, in order to
encourage peers to share their resources there needs to be an
incentive scheme that rewards cooperation and punishes free-
riding.
BitTorrent [4] is a prominent example of a P2P file-sharing
system that includes a solid incentive scheme called tit-for-tat
(TFT). TFT provides incentives to share resources for peers
with direct relations and resources of same kind. Two peers are
in a direct relation if both peers demand and supply resources
of the same kind. The TFT scheme is useful for applications
with many direct relations. This is typically the case for P2P
file-sharing systems, especially when sharing popular files.
In a P2P collaboration network, however, the peers’ re-
lations are often non-direct and resources are of different
kind. Besides contributing bandwidth and storage space, in
a P2P collaboration network a peer also contributes with
editing of documents and voting for or against changes of
documents. The voting mechanism ensures a high quality of
those documents [3], [17]. In such a system, TFT cannot be
applied as it does not support non-direct relations.
Therefore, this paper proposes a new incentive scheme for
large-scale, fully decentralized P2P collaboration networks
which overcomes the shortcomings of TFT. The proposed
incentive scheme is based on a reputation mechanism, which
assigns every peer a certain reputation value that reflects the
peer’s previous behavior in the network. The services a peer
can get from other peers are differentiated based on that value:
the higher a peer’s reputation, the higher the quality of service
the peer can get.
In general, a reputation mechanism consists of the following
three parts:
1) Definition of metrics to calculate a peer’s reputation
2) Secure and efficient propagation of reputation values
3) Differentiation of services based on reputation values
A lot of work has already been done on 2., i.e. the problem
of reputation management [9], [5], [13]. In contrast to the issue
of propagation of reputation values, the problem of defining
a metric for calculating a peer’s reputation has not received
much attention. Most approaches assume a simple reputation
metric, where the reputation of a peer is based on a single
aspect, e.g., the number of files uploaded. Consequently, the
focus of this paper will be on the definition of reputation
metrics and on the service differentiation. The existence of
a mechanism to safely propagate reputation values in a P2P
network is assumed.
The proposed reputation metric and service differentiation
is analyzed and simulated with rational, irrational and altru-
istic peers using game theoretical approaches. The simulation
model is a collaboration network with resources and services
such as sharing documents, editing documents, and voting for
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documents. Results show that the amount of shared resources
can be increased by at least 8-10%. Additionally, this paper
shows that rational peers behave according to the majority. If
the majority behaves irrationally, the rational peers will adapt
to this.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: First, Section
2 discusses related work, before the design of the actual
reputation-based incentive scheme is presented in Section 3.
Afterwards, the simulation model is outlined in Section 4.
Section 5 presents the results from the simulation and analysis
of the effectiveness of the scheme. Finally, Section 6 draws
conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK
Related work in the area of reputation-based incentives for
P2P networks is addressed as follows. Game theory provides
the necessary basis to analyze incentives in general. Then,
two categories of incentive schemes are outlined. Finally, a
brief overview of approaches for shared history reputation
management is given.
A. Game Theory
Game Theory suggests that people behave rationally, i.e.
given a set of possible actions they will try to take the one
that maximizes their utility, where the utility is the difference
between the benefit and the costs of the action [6]. For
file sharing in a P2P network, this means that if a user
can choose between sharing or not sharing a file he will
tend not to share it, i.e. free-ride the system, because that
inflicts less cost upon him. However, this model does not
fully reflect reality, as there are typically peers who share
without seeking a benefit. This shortcoming is addressed by
introducing the following standard behavior types: altruistic,
rational, and irrational [15]. An altruistic user contributes to
the system without weighing benefits against costs, whereas an
irrational user acts unpredictably and anti-socially. Examples
of irrational behavior are, e.g., the spreading of viruses or
online vandalism. A repeated play of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
seems to be an appropriate model of interaction among users
in a P2P network [5]. A very effective strategy [2] to play
the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma is Tit-for-tat, as for example
BitTorrent [4] implements it.
Ma et al. show game theoretic approaches to provide incen-
tives and service differentiation [11]. The authors designed a
protocol with a bidding mechanism for resource distribution.
Contribution values are stored in an auditing authority. Their
mechanism achieves Pareto-optimal allocation results and can
adapt to node joins and node failures.
B. Categories of Incentive Schemes
Incentive schemes can be divided into two categories: trade
based and trust based schemes [12]. Trade based schemes are
based on some kind of currency, e.g., micropayments, which
can be used by peers in exchange for resources shared with
other peers. Every file, for instance, has a price that has to
be paid before downloading. Trust based incentive schemes,
on the other hand, manage a reputation value of each peer
which reflects the peer’s previous behavior in the system. A
peer with a high reputation is likely to get better services than
a peer with a low reputation.
1) Trade based Schemes: Trade based schemes such as Off-
line Karma [7] are very efficient from an economic point of
view. Every peer gets exactly as much from the system as it is
willing to contribute. The main drawback of these schemes is
that in order to manage some sort electronic currency, they
either require a central authority or they produce a lot of
overhead in terms of communication costs, both of which is
not desirable.
2) Trust based Schemes: Trust based schemes can be
divided into private or shared histories [5]. With a private
history every peer keeps track of the behavior of other peers
in direct relation and adapts its policy. With a shared history
the actions of all peers are known, i.e. a peer can adapt its
policy to any other peer even without direct relation.
C. Reputation Systems
Service differentiation is designed in such a way that users
will strive to get a high reputation value for a high Quality-of-
Service (QoS). In order to get a high reputation, users should
be forced to social behavior, i.e. behavior beneficial to other
peers. Before service differentiation can take place, the peer’s
reputation value has to be computed and made accessible to
all other users. The issue of propagating reputation values
safely, i.e. by avoiding any collusion and false reports, is a
challenge. Several proposals have already been made to tackle
these problems. The EigenTrust algorithm [9] is an elegant
and efficient way of computing global trust values. It works
similar to the PageRank algorithm used by Google [13]. In
the EigenTrust approach, the global trust value of peer k is
the k-th component of the left principal eigenvector of the
trust matrix C = (cij), where cij for peer i is the local
reputation of peer j. Unfortunately, EigenTrust is not safe
against collusion. For example, peers can boost their reputation
score by simply uploading some files to a highly reputable
peer [10]. Additional mechanisms are needed to prevent these
kinds of attacks.
Another approach is the Maximum Flow (MaxFlow) algo-
rithm [5], which determines the maximum ’flow’ that can be
achieved between a source node and a target node in a directed
graph, given some capacity constraints for every edge [14]. For
a P2P network, the source and target node are interpreted as
users, and the constraints refer to the local trust value a peer
assigns to its neighboring peers. Then the maximum flow is
the maximum reputation the source node can assign to the
target node without violating reputation constraints.
III. REPUTATION DESIGN
This section defines how the reputation value is calculated
from the actions of a peer. First, the reputation function and
the contribution value functions are provided. Then, the service
differentiation functions and the utility functions are shown.
The goal of these mechanisms is to stimulate peers to actively
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participate in a P2P network. Section IV defines a model of
a P2P network to analyze and measure the efficiency of those
mechanisms.
A. Reputation Function
First, general properties of reputation values are shown
before proceeding to the concrete definition of the reputation
function. Reputation values are based on how much a peer
contributes to the P2P network. This contribution value is de-
fined as C(action1, action2, ..., actionn) ≥ 0, where actioni
i = 1, 2, ..., n are its actions undertaken. The more a peer
contributes, the higher is its contribution value and, thus, its
reputation value.
If a peer joins the network its initial reputation value
Rmin has to be larger than 0. Otherwise, the peer could
not download anything from other rational peers, because
resource consumption such as downloading depends on the
reputation of a peer (see Section III-C). On the other hand, a
high Rmin provides incentives for whitewashing the identity.
The reputation value also needs to have a certain maximum
value Rmax = 1. Finally, the reputation value should increase
quite fast at the beginning, in order to motivate newcomers to
contribute to the system.
To meet these requirements, the reputation value R has been
defined as a monotonically increasing function in the contri-
bution value C, R : ℜ≥0 → [Rmin, 1]. As a representation of
R a logistic function
R(C) =
1
1 + g · exp(−β · C)
is used, which satisfies all the above properties. Figure 1 shows
this function for e.g., g = 19 and different values of β.
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Figure 1. Reputation function: g = 19, β
B. Contribution Value
While the number of shared articles and the amount of
shared bandwidth is easy to measure, the effort involved in
editing and voting is difficult to quantify. Therefore, there is
no simple answer to questions like storing how many articles
is equal to editing an article. To circumvent this problem, two
different contribution values are introduced: one for sharing
articles and bandwidth and another one for voting and editing.
The justification for this is that sharing articles and bandwidth
are comparable to each other, as are voting and editing. As a
consequence, each user has two reputation values:
• RS(CS), the reputation for sharing articles and band-
width
• RE(CE), the reputation for voting and editing
From a global perspective, storing and editing articles as
well as sharing bandwidth and voting are all desirable actions.
Therefore, the contribution value should increase, if one of
these actions are undertaken. To be more precise, editing arti-
cles and voting are only desired if they are done constructively,
i.e. if the intention is to improve the quality of the articles.
The contribution values are defined as the weighted sum of
their respective desirable actions.
1) Contribution Value for Sharing Bandwidth and Storage:
First, the contribution value for article and bandwidth sharing
is
CS(a, b) = αS · Sarticles + βS · Sbandwidth − dS
where
• Sarticles are the actually shared articles
• Sbandwidth is the actually shared bandwidth
• αS ∈ ℜ>0, βS ∈ ℜ>0 are constants that are used to
weight the different actions. For instance, αS = 1 and
βS = 2 means that sharing bandwidth is twice as valuable
as offering articles for download.
• dS ∈ ℜ>0 is a constant, the decay term. The decay term
works as follows: if a peer is inactive for some time its
contribution value will decrease.
2) Contribution Value for Editing and Voting: Similarly, the
contribution value for editing and voting is defined as
CE(v, e) = αE · Svotes + βE · Sedits − dE
where
• Svotes are the successful votes. A vote is successful, if
and only if it is cast with the majority
• Sedits are the accepted edits. An edit is accepted, if and
only if a majority votes for the edit
• αE ∈ ℜ>0, βE ∈ ℜ>0 are constants similar to αS and
βS .
• dE ∈ ℜ>0 is a decay term analog to dS
C. Service Differentiation
Service differentiation is discussed using the following
services. Downloading an article, editing an article, and casting
a vote on an edit.
1) Downloading: If several peers want to download a file
from the same source, they compete for the source’s upload
bandwidth. With the incentive mechanism, a peer i gets the
amount of bandwidth equal to the ratio of its sharing reputation
RS compared to the sum of the sharing reputation of all peers
that download from the same source. More formally, let Dj
be the set of peers that download from peer j. Then, for each
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peer i ∈ Dj the percentage of bandwidth Bi it gets from
peer j’s upload bandwidth is
Bi =
RiS∑
k∈Dj
RkS
2) Voting: In order to get a set of constructive and capable
voters, voting privileges are limited to those users that take
voting seriously. It is assumed that if a peer has previously
edited an article, it has knowledge of the subject and little
interest in disruptive behavior, at least concerning its own
article. Therefore, only successful editors of an article will
get the right to vote on changes of that article.
There are two additional mechanisms to provide incentives
in the voting process: weighted voting and punishment of
malicious voters. Weighted voting means that a peer’s voice
counts in proportion to its voting and editing reputation RE .
If V is the set of voters on an edit, then each peer i ∈ V has
the voting power
vi =
RiE∑
k∈V R
k
E
Punishment of malicious voters works as follows: if the
number of a peer’s unsuccessful votes, i.e. votes against the
majority, exceeds a certain threshold it will lose its voting
rights. To get any new rights, the peer has to contribute
constructive edits first.
3) Editing: In order to make vandalism more difficult, an
initial cost for the editing is incurred. Before a peer gets the
ability to edit articles it must have contributed some resources
to the network, i.e. its sharing reputation must be above a
certain threshold: RS ≥ θ > RminS .
Moreover, peers who have written many articles need less
consent on their edits because generally they are expected to
make good edits. On the other hand, peers with few edits need
more votes for a successful edit. Therefore, the majority M of
a vote is inversely proportional to the editor’s reputation.
Punishment of malicious editors works as follows: if a peer
has too many declined edits it will lose its editing right. This
is done by setting its sharing reputation to the minimum value:
RS = R
min
S . In addition, the editing reputation RE drops to
the minimum value as well: RE = RminE .
D. Utility Function
The utility functions for sharing resources, editing, and
voting are defined as follows. For simplicity, all peers are
assumed to have the same download and upload bandwidth,
which is normalized to 1. Moreover, the file size is set to 1 for
all files. Thus, if a peer uploads a file its upload bandwidth is
always fully used.
1) Utility for Sharing Articles and Bandwidth: The utility
for sharing articles and bandwidth is defined as
US = α · UPsource ·B − β ·DSarticles − γ · UPown
where
• UPsource is the source’s shared upload bandwidth
• B is the percentage of the download bandwidth of the
peer as defined in Section III-C1
• DSarticles is the percentage of disk space used for
sharing articles
• UPown is the percentage of upload bandwidth shared by
the peer itself
• α, β, γ ∈ ℜ are constants to reflect the benefit of
downloading and the cost of sharing
The utility US can take positive and negative values, de-
pending on the peer’s sharing and downloading behavior.
2) Utility for Editing and Voting: Similarly, the utility of
editing and voting is defined as
UE = δ · Esucc + ǫ · Vsucc
where
• E is the number of successful edits
• V is the number of successful votes
• δ, ǫ ∈ ℜ are modifiers analog to α, β, γ
The cost of editing and voting are not considered in the
formula because both of these cannot be explained rationally.
There must be an altruistic motivation for them.
IV. SIMULATION MODEL
The formal simulation model to test the effectiveness of
the incentive mechanism described in the previous section, is
outlined. The model is based on the assumptions of Game
Theory that have been described in Section 2.
In the model, time is discretized. At every time step, a peer
downloads an article from another peer with probability P =
1
NS
, where NS is the number of peers that offer any files for
download. At the same time, the peer chooses how many files
and how much bandwidth it wants to share. It is also possible
to edit an article and to vote on any changes.
In the simulation, every peer is represented by a self-
learning agent that will try to maximize its benefit by exploring
different strategies. The learning algorithm is Q-Learning, an
efficient temporal-difference reinforcement learning algorithm
[16]. Before proceeding to the simulation itself, the concept
of Q-Learning is briefly described.
A. Q-Learning
In reinforcement learning, and particularly in Q-Learning,
there is an agent interacting with its environment over a set of
actions. For each action it gets a feedback or reward from the
environment, and over time it learns what actions are best in
a given situation to maximize the utility. More formally, time
is divided into discrete steps t = 1, 2, 3, .... At each time step
t, the environment is in a state st ∈ S, where S is the set of
possible states, and the agent chooses an action at ∈ A(st),
where A(st) is the set of possible actions in state st. It gets a
reward rt, and the state of the environment changes to st+1.
The agent’s goal is to maximize its expected reward
R = r0 + γ · r1 + γ
2 · r2 + γ
3 · r3 + ... =
∞∑
t=0
γt · rt
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where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is a discounting factor that decides how
much the agent considers future payoffs.
Q-Learning solves this task by assigning every state-action
pair (s, a) ∈ S × A the Q-Value Q (s, a) that equals the
expected reward if action a is undertaken in state s and a
fixed strategy is followed thereafter:
Q (s, a) ← (1− α)Q (s, a) + α
(
r + γmax
b∈A
Q (s′, b)
)
where α ∈ ℜ is the learning rate and s′ is the state that
follows from taking action a in state s.
To solve the exploration-exploitation problem, the agent
chooses an action probabilistically over a Boltzmann distri-
bution (which is a probability distribution originally used in
Thermodynamics). In general, an action with a high Q-Value
should have a higher probability to be chosen. In each round,
the probability to take action a in state s is:
ps (a) =
exp
(
Q(s,a)
T
)
∑
b∈A exp
(
Q(s,b)
T
)
T ∈ ℜ, the ’temperature’, controls the amount of explo-
ration. A high T makes the agent choose an action almost
uniformly at random, whereas a low T makes high Q-Values
more probable. Figure 2 shows two Boltzmann distributions
for the values x = 1, 2, ...10 and the temperatures T = 2 and
T = 1.000.
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Figure 2. A Boltzmann distribution for values x = 1, 2, ..., 10, T = 2 (top)
and T = 1000 (bottom)
B. Simulation Setting
In the simulation, there is a training phase of 10.000 time
steps in which T is set to the highest possible floating-point
value. This grants that the agents will explore all actions with
equal probability and that no agent will have a degenerated
Q-Matrix. After that, the reputation values are reset but the
agents keep their Q-Matrices. In this phase, T is set to 1 so
that the agents choose their actions weighted towards the ones
with the highest Q-Values.
For the simulation, there are 10 states, where each state con-
sists simply of the agent’s reputation. Let Rmin = 0.05. Then,
each state represents 110 of the reputation interval [0.05, 1]. The
network consists of 100 agents. With regard to sharing, an
agent can choose from three different participation levels for
each resource: 0%, 50% or 100% of their bandwidth; and 0,
50 or 100 files. If an agent is interested in editing and voting, it
can do it either constructively or destructively. The following
convention regarding user types is used: rational peers always
try to maximize their benefit, irrational ones are always free-
riders with regard to sharing as well as destructive editors and
voters. Altruistic peers always share the most they can and
perform only constructive edits and votes. In the simulation,
the occurrence of each user type is varied from 10 − 100%
while the other two types each share half of the difference to
100%. So for example, in the first run there are 10% rational
and 45% altruistic and irrational users. Then 20% rational and
40% altruistic and irrational users, and so on.
V. RESULTS
The amount of shared resources with incentive and without
incentive mechanisms are compared. Moreover, the perfor-
mance under the influence of different mixtures of user types
is evaluated.
The metrics of interest are the percentage of shared files
and bandwidth per user and especially per rational user.
Furthermore, the ratio of constructive to destructive edits and
the percentage of accepted constructive edits are measured.
A. Effectiveness with Rational Peers
In this result set, only rational peers are considered. Figure 3
shows the amount of shared articles and bandwidth with
and without the incentive scheme. If the incentive scheme
is applied, the amount of sharing is higher: the peers share
approximately 8% more articles and approximately 11% more
bandwidth.
The results show that even though the agents share more
resources if the scheme is applied, the difference is not as big
as one might expect. An explanation for this might be that
sharing more resources does not pay off and, therefore, a peer
chooses to stay at a low reputation level. This is due to the fact
that the percentage of upload bandwidth a peer gets, increases
linearly with the reputation value, while the reputation function
itself flattens very quickly after the inflection point. This means
that after this point the agents have to spend much more
resources than they can get back from downloading, which
results in the above behavior.
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Figure 3. Amount of shared articles (top) and bandwidth (bottom) with
rational peers
B. Influence of Different User Types
In this result set, different mixtures of behavior types are
considered. As expected, the overall network performance
increases in the number of altruistic agents and degrades in
the number of irrational ones, as can be seen in Figure 4.
If sharing articles and bandwidth is considered, this effect
is nearly linear, that is, the behavior of rational agents does
not seem to be affected by varying degrees of altruistic and
irrational agents (see Figure 5).
Rational agents share their resources even if many irrational
agents are present. On the other hand, altruistic agents do
not boost resource sharing. One could have expected that if
there are many altruistic agents, they exert some pressure on
rational peers because altruistic agents generally have high
reputation values and, therefore, occupy larger parts of the
upload bandwidth than their rational counterparts. However,
this effect was not observed.
With regard to editing, the simulations show a different
picture. Rational peers do their edits in such a way that
their article will be accepted by the community. Their voting
behavior is similar, i.e. they will try to vote with the majority.
As a consequence, the general tendency of the network - if
peers behave constructively or destructively - depends strongly
on the number of altruistic and irrational peers (see Figure 7).
If the network consists solely of rational agents the outcome
is completely random (see Figure 6). This is because initially,
the rational agents try constructive and destructive voting and
editing behavior at random. They get their reward depending
on how many other agents exhibit the same behavior like
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Figure 4. Amount of shared articles (top) and bandwidth (bottom) per peer
with varying degrees of altruistic (circle) and irrational (triangle) peers
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Figure 5. Amount of shared articles (top) and bandwidth (bottom) per rational
peer with varying degrees of altruistic (circle) and irrational (triangle) peers
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themselves. For example, if 60% of the agents have selected
a destructive voting behavior, the chance to succeed with
destructive voting behavior is bigger than with constructive
behavior. This way, the agents may learn that constructive
behavior does not pay off.
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Figure 6. Percentage of constructive (orange/grey bar) and destructive
(brown/dark bar) edits by rational agents if number of altruistic and irrational
agents are equal
However, if there are more altruistic than irrational agents
the simulations show a clear result: the rational agents learn
to behave constructively, thereby creating an even greater
majority of ’good’ agents so that eventually almost all good
edits are accepted whereas the bad ones are declined. An
analog conclusion holds if there are more irrational than
altruistic agents.
VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, a reputation-based incentive scheme for large-
scale, fully decentralized peer-to-peer collaboration networks
was designed. Its main goals are i) to encourage the partici-
pants of the network to share their resources such as bandwidth
and storage space; and ii) to ensure a certain quality of the
documents that are shared. The main idea of the scheme is to
assign a reputation value to every peer reflecting its previous
behavior. Based on this reputation value, the quality of service
is determined: the higher a peer’s reputation the higher its
quality of service.
The scheme is vulnerable to the presence of too many
malicious peers with regard to editing. This means that in
order for the scheme to work as intended, initially there must
be more constructive than destructive peers. However, this
requirement should be met in a real network, because the first
users, e.g., the founders of the network, are expected to have
a strong interest to ensure the quality of the network.
In a simulation with self-learning agents, the scheme was
shown to be very robust, but moderately effective with regard
to resource sharing. The reputation function has a great influ-
ence on how much resources are shared. Thus, future work
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Figure 7. Percentage of constructive (orange/grey bar) and destructive
(brown/dark bar) edits by rational agents under influence of varying number
of altruistic (top) and irrational (bottom) agents
will investigate new and existing reputation function in order
to maximize sharing of resources. In a next step, this new
incentive scheme will be adapted and implemented in a P2P
network for further simulations.
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